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Abstract
With the increasing popularity of the Internet, information technology is
changing the way we interact, entertain, communicate and consume. Concur-
rently, traditional social forums, such as the League of Women Voters, the
United Way, or the monthly bridge club, have seen a decrease (Putnam 2000).
Supporting thousands of online communities, the Internet poses an opportunity
to create new social capital to replace what is lost by the decline of bowling
leagues and fraternal societies. In online communities, groups of people meet
to share information, discuss mutual interests, play games and carry out busi-
ness. Users of communities such as SourceForge (http://sourceforge.net/)
and Wikipedia (http://www.wikipedia.org/) contribute information goods,
which are typically shared as public goods. However, despite the popularity
of online communities, many such communities fail due to nonparticipation
and under-contribution. For example, Butler (2001) found that 50% of social,
hobby, and work mailing lists had no traffic over a 122 day period. Under-
contribution is a problem even in active and successful online communities. For
example, in MovieLens (http://www.movielens.org), an online movie recom-
mendation website that invites users to rate movies and, in return, makes per-
sonalized recommendations and predictions for movies the user has not already
rated, under-contribution is common. More than 22% of the movies listed on
the site have fewer than 40 ratings, so few that the software cannot make ac-
curate predictions about which users would like these movies (Cosley, Ludford
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and Terveen 2003). Similarly, Eureka, a Xerox Corporation online information
sharing system, which enables its 20,000 worldwide customer service engineers
to share repair tips, also suffers from under-contribution. While many service
engineers download machine repair tips from Eureka, only an estimated 20%
have submitted a validated tip to the system (Bobrow and Whalen 2002).
To resolve the problem of under-contribution, economists might turn to
the theories of incentive-compatible mechanisms for public goods provision.
However, most mechanism design theories regarding public goods rely on tax-
subsidy schemes.1 Thus, they cannot be directly applied to online communities,
as these communities rely on voluntary participation and contribution of time
and effort rather than monetary transfers to encourage contributions.
Furthermore, compared to traditional communities, online communities have
distinct characteristics, which give the mechanism designer a new set of options.
Most notably, the designer has more information than is traditionally assumed
in mechanism design theory.2 For example, some software can track the de-
tailed activities of each user, including a user’s click stream and a time stamp
for each activity. From these data, the designer can infer important under-
lying user preferences and the time cost of each activity. Such information
has been used to target customers in e-commerce, as in Amazon.com’s book
recommendations.3
In this paper, we explore how users change behavior due to the provision of
social information in online communities. In particular, we investigate whether
applying social comparison theory (Festinger 1954) can alleviate the problem
of under-contribution in such communities. Social comparison theory is based
on the idea that people evaluate themselves by comparison with other people.
Festinger (1954) theorized that we compare ourselves to others who are better
off for guidance, and to others who are worse off to increase our self-esteem. A
1See Groves and Ledyard (1987) for a survey of the theoretical literature and Chen (forthcoming)
for a survey of the experimental literature.
2In dominant strategy and Nash implementations, it is usually assumed that the designer knows
nothing about the underlying distribution of preferences or the production technology, while in
Bayesian implementation, it is usually assumed that the designer knows the distribution of agent
preferences, but not the realization in individual agents.
3For example, the book Touching the Void (Simpson 1988), a mountain climber’s account of near
death in the Peruvian Andes, received good reviews and modest success when it was first published,
and was soon forgotten. Years later, another mountain-climbing tragedy, Into Thin Air (Krakauer
1999), became a publishing sensation. Amazon began to recommend Touching the Void to readers
who bought Into Thin Air. Eventually Touching the Void outsold Into Thin Air more than two to
one (Anderson 2004).
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large body of literature in social psychology shows that social comparisons af-
fect behavior, since individuals gain information on what constitutes the “right
behavior” in various contexts, as well as how successful one might be based
on a comparison target’s performance. Furthermore, social comparison theory
suggests that people lean toward social comparisons in situations that are am-
biguous (see Buunk and Mussweiler (2001), Suls, Martin and Wheeler (2002)
for recent surveys), a condition which is true in many online communities. Al-
though we are not aware of a mathematical formalization of social comparison
theory, three special cases of this theory have been formalized in economics.
In the first case, when information regarding prevalent behavior is available,
people exhibit the tendency to copy this behavior, a phenomena referred to
as conformity (Asch (1956), Akerlof (1980), Bernheim (1994)). In the sec-
ond case, when outcome information regarding other people’s payoffs or net
benefits is available, people show distributional concerns, such as inequality
aversion (Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)). In this case,
participants in the laboratory act to reduce payoff inequalities. A third related
literature model interdependent preferences, where utility functions depend not
only on the absolute value of consumption, but also on either the average level
of consumption (Duesenberry (1949), Pollak (1976)), or the ordinal rank in
the distribution of consumption (Frank (1985), Robson (1992), Hopkins and
Kornienko (2004)). Samuelson (2004)’s evolutionary model provides a justifi-
cation for preferences that incorporate relative consumption effects in order to
compensate for incomplete environmental information.
Most studies of the impact of social comparison in economic decision making
are conducted in the laboratory, using variants of the dictator games (e.g., Ca-
son and Mui (1998), Krupka and Weber (2005), Duffy and Kornienko (2007)),
the ultimatum bargaining games (e.g., Knez and Camerer (1995), Duffy and
Feltovich (1999), Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004)), or coordination games (Eckel
and Wilson 2006). In comparison, we designed a natural field experiment
(Harrison and List 2004) to compare the effects of different types of social
information on contributions to an online community. We implement our ex-
periment through a combination of email newsletters and direct modification of
the MovieLens website. A natural field experiment provides a bridge between a
laboratory experiment and direct field observations. Specifically, it allows us to
study behavior in a more natural environment than the lab with participants
who are the actual users of the site. Meanwhile, it gives the researcher more
control than field observations as we can randomly assign users to different
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treatments and keep all aspects of the environment constant across treatments
except for the type of social information.
To our knowledge, this is the first embedded online field experiment which
examines the effects of social information on non-monetary contributions.4 To
study this question, we implement a randomized field experiment on Movie-
Lens by sending users an email newsletter which contains one of two types of
social information: the median number of ratings or the net benefit score of
an average user in her cohort. The control group receives information about
only their own past rating behavior. We then modify the interface for each
user, with new shortcuts that lead to different types of contributions, includ-
ing rating popular or rare movies, updating the database, inviting a buddy or
just visiting MovieLens. We then track user behavior for a month after the
release of the newsletter. From this experiment, we find that, after receiving
behavioral information about the median user’s total number of movie ratings,
users below the median have a 530% increase in the number of monthly movie
ratings, while those above the median decrease their monthly ratings by 62%.
Movements from both ends converge towards the median, indicating conformity
towards a newly-established social norm in a community where such norm was
absent. Furthermore, when given outcome information about the average user’s
net benefit score, consistent with social preference theory, we find that users
with net benefit scores above average contributed 94% of the new updates in
the database. In sum, we demonstrate that social information can be effective
in increasing contributions to online communities.
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